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Abstract  
Modern financial regulation has predominantly been economically-driven,1 progressing from 
addressing market failures to making markets more competitive and work better. 2  The UK Financial 
Conduct Authority is expressly mandated to pursue regulatory objectives that maintain market 
integrity and protect consumers (addressing market failures) and to promote competition (making 
markets work better). 3 Both the FCA and its sister regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority (for 
banks) have recently adopted innovative regulatory initiatives to promote technologically-driven 
innovation, aimed at making markets work better. These initiatives are also a response to the recent 
explosion of technologically-led financial innovation outside of the regulatory perimeter.  
In promoting financial innovation, we argue that the regulators have insufficiently focused on the 
need to govern financial innovation more generally. Although this concern may seem premature, the 
regulatory innovations are increasingly extending the perimeter for regulatory oversight of financial 
innovations. As the regulatory innovations have the potential to develop into more mature 
regulatory frameworks for governing financial innovation, we argue that regulators should manage 
the risks of their current approach and develop a regulatory strategy framework for balancing 
regulatory objectives and developing regulatory policy. We propose a framework anchored in 
rationality, consistency and accountability in governing financial innovation.  
Wordcount excluding abstract: 11, 799 
Introduction 
Regulation is often seen as antithetical to pro-market objectives, 4 but the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) has an express mandate to promote competition in financial markets. The FCA’s 
recent endeavours to promote competition has led it to launch Project Innovate5 to support 
technological revolutions in finance (‘fintech’,6 financial regulatory compliance solutions, called 
‘regtech’ and ‘techfin’7, which refers to non-finance companies in other sectors that foray into 
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1 Summed up in chapter 3, Armour et al, Principles of Financial Regulation (Oxford: OUP 2015). The rationales 
for financial regulation have progressed from being driven by market efficiency to a broader form of economic 
public interest, such as in collective financial stability, especially after the global financial crisis 2007-9. See also 
Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford: Routledge 2014). 
2 Gillian Hadfield, ‘Producing Law for Innovation’ in Kauffman Foundation, Rules for Growth (Missouri 2011) at 
chapter 2, also note Law in the Flat World (2010) at works.bepress.com/ghadfield. 
3 Sections 1B to 1E, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 amended by the Financial Services Act 2012. 
4 This point will be discussed in greater detail in Section A. For eg see Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta, 
‘Regulation, Productivity and Growth: OECD Evidence’ (World Bank Research Paper 2003); Alain de Serres, 
Shuji Kobayakawa, Torsten Sløk and Laura Vartia, ‘Regulation of Financial Systems and Economic Growth’ 
(OECD Working Paper 2006) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=965693. 
5 See https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovate-innovation-hub. 
6 Price Waterhouse Coopers, Blurred Lines: How Fintech is Shaping the Financial Services Industry (March 
2016); Douglas Arner, Jànos Barberi and Ross P Buckley, ‘The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis 
Paradigm?’ (2015) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2676553. 
7 Dirk Zetzsche, Douglas Arner, Ross P Buckley and Janos N Barberis, ‘From Fintech to Techfin: The Regulatory 
Challenges of Data-Driven Finance’ (2017) at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2959925. 
financial services as part of the economies of scale achieved in their business models, usually 
relating to data collection and analytics).8 The explosion of ‘fintech’, ‘regtech’ and ‘techfin’ in the 
recent decade is a marked trend as unconventional or non-traditional products, services and 
markets have arisen to meet the lacunae left by banks damaged during the global financial crisis 
2007-9.9 ‘Project Innovate’ can be seen as a necessary step for regulators as the boundaries of 
regulatory policy are being challenged by these new industry developments.10  However, regulators 
also see the potential in these innovations in contributing to more competitive financial markets. 
Thus, a novel regulatory mechanism known as the ‘Regulatory Sandbox’11 which is part of Project 
Innovate, is introduced to attract innovative firms (a) to engage in pre-regulatory processes with a 
view towards helping them launch in market,  while (b) also bringing them within the scope of 
governance and oversight.  A similarly dedicated mechanism for financial innovation relating to 
investment advice has also been established under the FCA’s Advice Unit.12 The FCA, with its sister 
regulator for major banks in the UK, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) has also launched the 
‘New Bank Start-up Unit’13 to promote challenger banks and shake up the landscape for banking 
services in the UK. The key tenets of the regulatory innovations are: bringing firms into a test 
environment, suspension of certain regulatory obligations for firms during testing, maintaining close 
engagement and supervision during testing with a view to considering if the firms and their products 
or services can be brought to market; and graduation from test environment.  
These regulatory innovations currently focus on promoting innovation as regulators attempt to 
induce firms to emerge from the shadows and engage with regulatory processes at earlier stages. As 
enrolling into the Regulatory Sandbox or Mobilisation regime is voluntary, much of financial 
innovation could remain outside the regulatory perimeter, and it may be a while before the new 
regimes are able to capture a substantial scope of financial innovation. However, as the Sandbox and 
Mobilisation regimes carve out an ‘interim’ area of permissible activities, they implicitly offer 
innovative firms and entities an alternative to the default mode of punitive regulatory enforcement 
against non-compliant activities. The scope of regulated financial services activities is highly 
comprehensive under the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,14 so the apparently voluntary 
nature of the Sandbox and Mobilisation regimes creates incentives for firms to distinguish 
                                                          
8 Douglas Arner, Jànos Barberis and Ross P Buckley, ‘FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualisation of Financial 
Regulation’ (2017) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business forthcoming at  
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847806; FCA, Call for Input: Supporting the Development and Adoption of RegTech 
(Nov 2015) and Feedback Statement: Call for Input: Supporting the Development and Adoption of RegTech (July 
2016). 
9 See an overview in Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, 
Intermediation and Markets — Policy Implications for Financial Regulators (2016) 21 Journal of Technology 
Law and Policy 168. 
10 Yeung provides an overview of regulatory response in the face of disruption that threatens to make 
regulatory policy obsolete or inappropriate- regulators could resist and enforce, or become overwhelmed or 
indeed choose to grapple with industry changes and adapt intelligently, see Karen Yeung, ‘Governance by 
Blockchain: The Coming Battle for Supremacy Between the Code of Law Vs Code as Law?’, speech at the 
Symposium on Blockchain and the New Financial Order, University College London, 19 June 2017. 
11 FCA, Regulatory Sandbox (Nov 2015). 
12 In light of the established market gaps for consumer investment advice, the FCA would look specifically into 
how financial technology innovation can fill the gap. See FCA, Financial Advice Markets Review (April 2017). 
13 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/nbsu/Pages/default.aspx. 
1414 S19 and Schedule 2, see also case law that has taken an approach of interpreting the scope of the 
regulatory perimeter as capturing all functionally equivalent activities as those prescribed in Schedule 2, for eg 
FSA v Anderson  [2010] EWHC 599 (Ch)). Further, see the hugely contested characterisation of land-banking 
schemes as illegal collective investments which was finally settled in the regulator’s favour after several years 
of litigation, see Asset Land Investment Plc v The Financial Conduct Authority [2016] UKSC 17.  
themselves from regulatory arbitrageurs, if not to evade possible antagonistic enforcement. We 
observe growth in the popularity of these regimes in their second year and the increasing extension 
of the regulatory perimeter for financial innovation (see Section A). Industry enthusiasm for the 
Regulatory Sandbox and Mobilisation Initiative shows that there is significant potential for these 
regulatory innovations to cover a meaningful scope of industry activity, although this remains work 
in progress. We see the Sandbox and Mobilisation regimes as a first step towards extending the 
regulatory perimeter over financial innovation, and argue that the regulators are well-positioned to 
develop these regimes further into comprehensive ones for governing financial innovation, and not 
merely promoting them for the purposes of enhancing competitive markets.  
At the moment, the regulatory innovations are positioned in a welcoming manner to reach out to 
innovative firms. However, we are concerned that regulators risk becoming too sympathetic towards 
firms in their desire to promote innovation, and this disposition can be reinforced by intense 
engagement with firms during the period in the Sandbox or Mobilisation. On the one hand, 
extensive intelligence can be obtained through such engagement to shape regulatory policy in areas 
of emerging importance, on the other hand there is a danger of enrolling firms at such an early stage 
with a potential to rewrite rules. We perceive two key issues of concern. One is that the 
predominance of the ‘servicing’ element in the regulators’ approach is not balanced by an observed 
regulatory strategy for governing financial innovation. Second, the intensity in the relational 
paradigm between regulator and firms may impact upon regulatory objectivity and rationality in 
designing regulatory policy. Policy and rule-making in governing financial innovation can be captured 
by the industry.  
In governing financial innovation, regulators need to make choices in the complex interrelationships 
between competition, innovation and other regulatory objectives such as consumer protection and 
financial stability. This is because the alignment between the objectives served by promoting 
competition or innovation, and other protective regulatory goals cannot be assumed. 15 Balance and 
trade-offs among regulatory objectives and priorities is a matter of regulatory strategy, and we posit 
this is where governing financial innovation is situated. Greater intensity in the relational paradigm 
between regulator and firm brings with it risks in terms of how regulatory strategy is ultimately 
influenced.   
The Regulatory Sandbox is being copied in other leading financial jurisdictions. 16  However, we 
should not be too quick to think that this regulatory approach has become a ‘gold standard’. The 
quick ‘copying’ and adaptation by other regulators can merely be due to the fear of being left 
behind.  
Section A explores the FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox and the PRA-FCA’s Mobilisation initiative for 
challenger banks. We critically tease out the regulatory risks in this enhanced relational paradigm 
between firms and regulator that may affect their potential to credibly govern financial innovation.  
Section B suggests that in governing financial innovation, the FCA’s and PRA’s regulatory innovations 
should be grounded in a ‘regulatory strategy’ framework. Regulatory strategy refers to the balancing 
exercise needed for the regulators’ multiple objectives that are pro-market as well as protective in 
nature. Further, regulators must recognise that promoting innovation is only a proxy for and is not 
identical to pursuing competition, and must review assumptions of such alignment. We argue that 
regulatory strategy can be conducted in a more rational and consistent manner and this provides a 
                                                          
15 Highlighted by the Financial Stability Board, see FSB, Financial Stability Implications from Fintech (27 June 
2016) at http://www.fsb.org/2017/06/financial-stability-implications-from-fintech/. 
16 Has been adopted in Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, Canada and Japan. 
framework for optimal regulatory policy and decision-making that mitigates the risks of relational 
influences.  Finally we argue that such a model should be supported by adequate elements of 
oversight and accountability. Section C concludes.  
A. UK Financial Regulators’ Role in Promoting Technology-led Financial Innovation  
The FCA launched the Innovation Hub after extensive consultation in 2014. This is in response to the 
growing trend in fintech innovation that has arisen to fill market gaps and exploit new efficiencies 
after the global financial crisis 2007-9 which hit many traditional financial institutions. The 
Innovation Hub provides a process for regulatory engagement with innovators so as to shed light on 
the continued relevance of existing regulation to industry practices.17 The Innovation Hub comprises 
of several aspects such as advice and support for innovators, focused themes for innovation such as 
fintech and regtech, event days for engagement between the FCA and interested constituents, and 
the Regulatory Sandbox, which is a regulatory mechanism for innovation testing and bringing to 
market.18 An extension of the Sandbox can be found in the FCA’s proposal to engage with innovation 
that deals specifically with plugging market gaps in investment advice.19  
The PRA’s sister outfit is focused on challenger banks in the UK. The New Bank Start up Unit20 is a 
joint initiative by the PRA and FCA and provides a platform for early stage advice and engagement 
with entrepreneurs that plan to start a new bank. Prospective new banks would then have to go 
through pre-application discussions to ensure that they have a viable business plan, that they 
understand the regulatory requirements for being authorised as a bank, and are able to put in 
process the requirements for regulatory compliance. A special regulatory regime of mobilisation 
may apply to them as they roll out their operations. 
The Regulatory Sandbox and Mobilisation for challenger banks are novel regulatory approaches. 
They allow regulators to proactively seek new firms or pre-regulatees, moving away from the 
previous position of being passive and reactive.21 Early regulatory engagement with financial 
innovation may mitigate the dangers of financial innovation being funnelled into shadow finance or 
areas of regulatory arbitrage.  Such a pro-active approach has the potential to capture an increasing 
scope of financial innovation, as innovators are encouraged to emerge from the shadows and 
engage with regulators. This approach also emphasises the relational paradigm between firm and 
regulator22 and signals a new dimension of regulatory responsiveness’23 in co-opting firm and 
industry opinions to feed into regulatory policies and decisions. As there is an element of ‘coaching’ 
involved in assisting firms to become fully operational and compliant, the regulator risks being 
captured by the innovative and challenger industries. 
                                                          
17 See interview with Martin Wheatley (CEO of FCA 2013-2015), at http://play.buto.tv/DWCTY. 
18 https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovate-innovation-hub. 
19 FCA, Financial Advice Markets Review (April 2017). 
20 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/nbsu/Pages/default.aspx. 
21 Nathan Cortez, ‘Regulating Disruptive Innovation’ (2014) 29 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 175. 
22 Described as a ‘performative turn’ in regulation, Ioannis Lianos, ‘Law, Fintech, and the Performative Turn in 
Regulation’, paper delivered at the Blockchain Technology and a New Financial Order conference, Centre for 
Law, Economy and Society, 19 June 2017, arguing that the regulator now makes regulatory policy and 
decisions within a new ‘society’ of innovators, the financial industry, socially embedding such policies and 
decisions, perhaps distinguishing from merely being economically driven. 
23 ‘Responsiveness’ in regulation first developed in relation to enforcement and securing proportionate 
enforcement that reinforces meaningful compliance, see Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation (Oxford: OUP 1992). This was subsequently developed responsiveness in the supervisory process 
see Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59.  
A key tenet in the new regulatory initiatives is regulatory suspension in the test environment. 
Regulation is suspended in whole or in part, as part of bringing the financial innovation or new bank 
to market. Such regulatory suspension is temporary and would be clearly delimited in terms of its 
expiry. However, in order to be eligible for such regulatory suspension, firms undergo an extensive 
selection process. Thereafter, the regulatory suspension is closely supervised. The regulators set out 
not to overburden new firms or innovations, while mitigating any potential social harm this may 
cause. Firms are subject to closer than normal scrutiny, as a tradeoff for these time-delimited 
regulatory suspensions. 
The industry has responded overwhelmingly to the regulators’ initiatives. In terms of the Regulatory 
Sandbox, the FCA has since mid-2015 issued two open calls for applicants. Applicants have to submit 
a testing plan that details the financial innovation to be tested in the market, the testing parameters 
such as timelines and key milestones of the testing process, measures for success of testing, 
customer safeguards, an assessment of the risks of the innovation in question and an exit strategy 
from testing.24 The FCA vets the applications extensively and selects those that the FCA considers to 
meet the criteria of: offering a genuine innovation and not merely a derivative product; likelihood of 
generating consumer benefit; having a need to be tested within a sandbox as the nature of the 
innovation may be unregulated or subject to uncertain regulatory perimeter; and the firm’s 
readiness for testing.25 In its first cohort, the FCA received 69 applications and selected 24 applicants 
for the Sandbox. In the second cohort the FCA received 71 applications and selected 31 firms.26 The 
Advice mechanism is relatively new and discussion is therefore focused on the Sandbox as a 
template approach. 
Regulatory suspension applies to successful applicants in the following manner. Successful Sandbox 
participants are issued with no-action letters with regard to the scope of activities agreed between 
them and the FCA.27 This is usually a suspension of most regulatory compliance requirements except 
for customer safeguards. Successful applicants may test financial innovation upon a real consumer 
base, or in a virtual sandbox. In the former situation, the FCA requires applicants to duly inform 
customers of the situation and of their safeguards, and does not exempt firms from potentially 
facing consumer redress or enforcement actions. The FCA would likely also set conditions and 
provide guidance for each firm in the Sandbox. This live testing environment would only last 3-6 
months as individually agreed between the FCA and each successful applicant. The firms are 
required to keep detailed records and regularly report to the FCA. The matters for reporting would 
deal largely with achievement of key milestones, consumer outcomes, the conditions imposed by 
the FCA upon the firm, and other requirements that may be individually agreed. At the end of the 
testing period, the FCA would make regulatory decisions with regard to each firm based on the 
extensive intelligence and intensive supervision maintained throughout the testing period. 
The Sandbox approach shows that the FCA implicitly accepts that there may be a trade-off between 
regulation that serves certain objectives, and promoting innovation for sometimes young firms that 
are not quite able to meet the full suite of regulatory requirements. Customer safeguards are 
regarded as not to be compromised, but the waiver for each firm is not publicised. We surmise that 
they may include organisational and prudential requirements, which are usually costly to set up. 
                                                          
24 FCA, Default Standards for Sandbox Testing Parameters at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/default-standards-for-sandbox-testing-parameters.pdf. 
25 https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox. 
26 https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/financial-conduct-authority-unveils-successful-sandbox-firms-
second-anniversary. 
27 FCA, Regulatory Sandbox (Nov 2015). 
Regulatory suspension comes with limitations in terms of market reach, thus minimising the risks of 
adverse impact on public interest as a result of regulatory suspension.  
In terms of the PRA’s New Bank Start-up Unit, the focus of the Unit is less on innovation but on 
challenger firms, as potential new banks do not have to offer something novel from established 
banking business. The key quality is their challenger potential and this arguably relates more directly 
to the regulatory objective of promoting competition. Nevertheless, Atom Bank which has become 
fully authorised after a year’s mobilisation offers novel and app-based interfaces for its customers, 
although the range of its products do not depart significantly from established banks. 
Firms that intend to enter into the banking business are encouraged to engage with the PRA at an 
early stage, and the PRA provides early stage advice as well as a more formal channel of pre-
application discussions and exploration of issues. When ready, applicants submit formal applications 
which the PRA will consider against the criteria of: viability of business plan; adequate financial 
resources; sources of funding; the identities of owner/s and controllers; the firm’s corporate 
governance; the firm’s risk management; the firm’s customer journey; the firm’s outsourcing; the 
firm’s information technology structures; the firm’s policies and procedures; the firm’s plans for 
recovery and resolution, as appropriate; and the needs for the firm’s business continuity.28  
The PRA’s vetting process includes interviews with individuals that would likely undertake the 
following roles in the firm: the Senior independent director; Chair of Risk and/or Audit Committee; 
Chief Executive Officer; Head of Branch (for branches of non EEA-firms); Risk Director/Chief Risk 
Officer; Finance Director/Chief Finance Officer. The decision-making process would likely take 6 
months after which the PRA would inform of the outcome. Successful applicants would then be 
informed of the scope of authorisation received and whether they would be put through the 
mobilisation route. Where a new bank is put through the mobilisation route, this means that the 
PRA has authorised the bank even though it has not fully met the requirements for authorisation. It 
is expected that the time spent in mobilisation would allow the bank to emerge fully able to meet 
regulatory requirements. 
Mobilisation29 allows the PRA to suspend the regulatory requirements in relation to information 
technology infrastructure and other organisational infrastructure, staff recruitment and engagement 
with third party suppliers. Banks in mobilisation should nevertheless be able to meet the regulatory 
requirements relating to a fully-developed and viable business plan, financial resources and 
corporate governance and a near-complete plan for customer safeguards. It would only need draft 
plans for IT and organisational infrastructure, business continuity, recovery and resolution, risk 
management and other policies and procedures- areas where the relevant regulatory requirements 
are suspended. The bank in mobilisation must also have in place a credible project plan as to how 
the bank intends to complete its build-up in order to emerge fully operational and compliant at the 
end of mobilisation.  
The mobilisation period would be agreed between the PRA and the new bank, usually at a maximum 
of 12 months. The new bank’s business activities would be restricted during mobilisation, such as 
not to take deposits above £50,000. Mobilisation would also be a period of intense supervision by 
the PRA. Regular reporting by the bank and feedback from the PRA would be expected in order to 
assist the bank to exit mobilisation. However there may be cases where a bank is unable to become 
                                                          
28 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/nbsu/Pages/submittingassessing.aspx. 
29 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/nbsu/Pages/mobilisation.aspx. 
fully operational or compliant in 12 months in which case the PRA would likely cancel the 
authorisation at the end of mobilisation. 
The PRA in implementing Mobilisation for challenger banks adopts a trade-off between certain 
regulatory objectives and promoting bank competition. The compromises are made in relation to the 
softer requirements of prudential regulation such as governance and risk management and 
resolution planning, which may be regarded as less important for banks that do not yet have 
significant scale. Hard prudential requirements such as capital resources and liquidity are however 
regarded as non-derogable. Further, by indicating that Mobilisation cannot be extended beyond 12 
months, the PRA seems to maintain a strong position in terms of ensuring that only financially stable 
and viable banks come to market. Nevertheless, softer aspects of prudential regulation may be 
crucial as poor risk management culture and corporate governance have a significant impact upon a 
bank’s risk profile.30 The PRA’s extensive interviews of individuals may however compensate for the 
non-insistence of formal compliance.  
The regulatory suspension employed in both the Sandbox and Mobilisation shows that regulators 
implicitly accept that trade-offs in regulatory objectives have to be made in their novel role of 
promoting innovation. We acknowledge that regulators have not carried this out lightly, as they seek 
to mitigate the potential market distortive effects that entail from such application of double 
standards. Firms are restricted in the scope of business they can engage in during testing or 
mobilisation; the regulatory suspension is delimited by a reasonably short time period (3-6 months 
for firms in the Sandbox and up to 12 months for banks in Mobilisation); restrictions and conditions 
are imposed upon business, and firms are subject to an intense supervision environment. The 
intensity of reporting and supervision for firms in the Sandbox and Mobilisation route arguably 
exceed what fully authorised firms would experience (under the PRA’s and FCA’s risk-based 
supervision approaches that categories supervisory needs according to firm risk).31  
The FCA’s feedback to consultees in 2014 prior to the launch of the Innovation Hub reflected an 
overwhelming industry perception of the law as being uncertain and potentially burdensome.32 The 
industry fedback that the scope of regulation was uncertain in terms of capturing new financial 
products and innovations, and that existing regulation, based on certain assumptions in business 
model and processes, may be ill-fitting for new financial products and services. It is uncertain to 
what extent the regimes for regulatory suspension in the Sandbox and Mobilisation reflect chiefly 
industry views, as there is a lack of articulation in terms of the basis upon which the specific 
regulatory suspensions were determined, and how the balancing exercise is conducted. There is 
public interest is ensuring that regulatory discretion at such a high level of strategy is exercised in a 
consistent and well-reasoned manner, as the public have an interest in ensuring the optimal 
governance of financial innovation. 
We argue that the governance of financial innovation should be based on a framework for 
regulatory strategy, implemented by the Sandbox and Mobilisation initiative.  A high-level framework 
                                                          
30 Basel Committee, Guidelines: Corporate Governance Principles for Banks (July 2015) at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf; G30, Banking Conduct and Culture: A Call for Sustained and 
Comprehensive Reform (July 2015), at http://group30.org/publications/detail/166.  
31 FCA, Journey to the FCA (Oct 2012), at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/journey-to-the-fca-
standard.pdf; PRA, Our Approach to Banking Supervision (Oct , 2012), at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/pra-approach-banking.pdf. 
32 FCA, Project Innovate: Call for input Feedback Statement (Oct 2014) at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/feedback/fs-14-2.pdf. 
like this is needed in order to prevent regulatory trade-off decisions from becoming captured by 
firm-centric bargaining or becoming inconsistent.  
The FCA and PRA do not report publicly on the outcomes of the Sandbox and Mobilisation. The first 
cohort of Sandbox firms have completed their Sandbox time by April 2017. Although their identities 
are published, the FCA has not published information as to whether the Sandbox firms have 
graduated to full authorisation, and whether there are lessons learnt for the development of 
regulatory strategy or policy. The PRA does not publish information on which new bank if any has 
entered Mobilisation or the outcome of Mobilisation. It is understandable that the specific 
arrangements between regulators and firms for the purposes of the Sandbox or Mobilisation are 
confidential. However, public disclosure can be made in terms of the regulators’ strategic learning 
without infringing confidentiality or jeopardising firms’ commercially sensitive information.  
The implementation of the Sandbox and Mobilisation route should become a means of governing 
financial innovation and not merely to function as service platforms for the industry. In the next 
Section, we argue that the Sandbox and Mobilisation route should be based on a framework for 
regulatory strategy that engages with complex balancing and trade-off decisions. We propose a 
model that is anchored in rationality, supported by mechanisms of accountability.  
B. A Framework for Regulatory Strategy to Govern Financial Innovation 
In promoting technologically-led financial innovation, we cannot assume that there would be no 
tensions within the suite of regulatory objectives that the FCA and PRA look after. Hence, the 
regulators’ role should not merely be to promote innovation, as firms already do that in their own 
interest. Instead, regulators should ensure that such promotion falls within a framework for 
governing financial innovation more broadly. Further, the FCA’s regulatory objective is to promote 
competition, and the regulators’ promotion of innovation is a proxy for promoting competition. The 
alignment between the two should not be readily assumed. Regulators’ roles in relation to financial 
innovation and challenger firms, should ultimately be one of governance and not merely promotion.  
Governing financial innovation involves grasping the complex interrelationships between regulation, 
competition and innovation. First, we set out the context of complex interrelationships between 
regulation, innovation and competition. Regulation can be seen as antithetical to competition, 
and/or to innovation, but regulators also play a salient role in shaping and calibrating the landscape 
for competition and/or innovation. We also argue that regulators’ assumption that promoting 
innovation is identical to promoting competition must be tested and reviewed. Regulators need to 
develop a strategic framework for choices to be made within these complex interrelationships, and 
we propose the development of a rational model to be implemented in the Sandbox and 
Mobilisation initiative towards that end. 
Regulation and Competitive Markets 
In an insufficiently competitive market, efficiency losses may result as incumbent firms may be 
complacent and sub-optimally productive,33 and consumers have less choice, resulting in welfare 
losses.34 Serres et al35 find that competitive financial markets are important for the growth of the 
                                                          
33 Francesco Daveri, Rémy Lecat and Maria Laura Parisi, ‘Service Deregulation, Competition and  
the Performance of French and Italian Firms’ (2011) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950551. 
34 Eg Arie Melnik and Oz Shy, ‘Exclusion, Competition, and Regulation in the Retail Loan Market’ (2014) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374975 on how competitive financial markets promote financial inclusion. 
35 Alain de Serres, Shuji Kobayakawa, Torsten Sløk and Laura Vartia, ‘Regulation of Financial Systems and 
Economic Growth’ (OECD Working Paper 2006) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=965693. 
financial services sector, whose size seems to be correlated strongly with economic growth in a 
country.  
Regulation can be perceived as antithetical to competitive markets. Conventional regulatory 
requirements such as business licensing, business restrictions or control can be seen as entailing 
anti-competitive effects36 as they raise barriers of entry to new firms. To an extent, the perception of 
regulation being a hindrance to the liberalisation of competitive markets led to extensive 
deregulation from the 1990s in many global financial jurisdictions.37 Although in the EU and UK there 
was less of a marked dismantling of regulation, and financial regulation was modernised and 
harmonised to promote the Single Market,38 pro-market rhetoric was very strong. Enabling facets of 
regulation (such as the EU passport for financial establishments and provision of cross-border 
services) preceded protective aspects.39 The UK Financial Services Authority (then-regulator and 
predecessor to the PRA and FCA) also adopted very light-touch approaches40 to regulation and 
supervision, leaving supervisory risks lightly or not highlighted, so that regulated firms would not be 
excessively burdened by regulation. 
The sidelining of regulation has however culminated in the excesses of risk-taking that led to the 
global financial crisis 2007-9.41 Although extensive deregulation has been reversed42 since the crisis, 
there is a need to calibrate different types of regulatory measures for different purposes in order to 
enable, control or correct different phenomena. Regulation can attack anti-competitiveness in order 
to maintain market competition. Further, certain types of regulation such as prudential regulation, 
conduct of business regulation and investor/consumer protection are necessary for public interest 
objectives that also support a healthy and competitive market. Prudential regulation acts as a check 
                                                          
36 Francesco Daveri, Rémy Lecat and Maria Laura Parisi, ‘Service Deregulation, Competition and  
the Performance of French and Italian Firms’ (2011) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950551 on the service sector 
generally in a number of countries under survey; Wulf A Kaal, ‘What Drives Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Cost 
for Private Funds?’ (2016) Journal of Alternative Investments at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629386 on how the 
introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act 2012 in the US created barriers to entry for smaller new mutual funds. 
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on financial risk-taking and sustains confidence of financial services users in the firms that they deal 
with. Conduct of business regulation also sustains consumer confidence as it is aimed at ensuring fair 
and non-abusive behaviour.  Investor and consumer protection standards including disclosure 
regulation are aimed at overcoming market failures such as information asymmetry or the inequality 
in bargaining power. These regulatory frameworks underlie and support financial markets,43 which 
may otherwise become a ‘jungle’ and market for lemons.44  Indeed Serres at al45 find that business 
restrictive regulations may be hindrances to competitive financial markets, but prudential and 
conduct of business regulation do not produce significant hindering impact.   
Further, EU financial regulation is market-building in nature and promotes a level playing field for 
cross-border movement of financial services.46 Lianos47 situates the positive role of regulation in 
promoting competition within the paradigm of ordoliberalism,48 which is the political-economy 
philosophy underlying the EU as an economic polity. In this way, regulation is not antithetical to 
competitive markets and could be a handmaiden to achieving economic outcomes.  
However there are instances where promoting market competition could conflict with another 
regulatory objective and trade-off decisions must be made. For example, as Serres et al  discussed, 
promoting growth in the financial services markets by promoting competition in turn promotes 
overall economic growth. But growth in financial services may mean the incurring of more 
household debt such as residential mortgages and unsecured personal loans. High levels of 
residential mortgage debt could fuel a housing price bubble, while high levels of personal debt may 
post significant consumer risks and may be unsustainable for the economy.  There is scope for 
regulatory policy to consider restrictions or cooling of activities or marketing49 in order to mitigate 
financial stability or consumer detriment risks. In another example,  promoting investment into 
collectively managed funds (such as occupational pensions) may promote growth in the financial 
services sector, but high levels of fund management raise challenges for maintaining investment 
profitability. Asset managers are increasingly chasing returns in unconventional assets that may be 
illiquid and this raises issues for investor protection in terms of liquidity risks as well as systemic risks 
that can ensue when investors collectively withdraw from funds. 50 Staikouras & Wood also argue 
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that51 there may be a trade-off between preserving banking sector stability and promoting 
competitive banking markets. This is because bank stability is safeguarded if the level of profits for 
banks is high and not volatile. As competition in the banking sector can adversely affect incumbent 
banks’ levels of profit and profit volatility, regulators need to consider carefully the unique balance 
of needs in their jurisdiction. 
The above contextual survey shows that there are many complexities in the interrelationship 
between promoting competition in financial markets and other regulatory objectives. Regulators 
need to make strategic choices in each relevant context. Such strategic choices should underpin the 
governance of financial innovation, which as we discuss below, is not an unequivocal good. As the 
modern regulatory state is characterised by the adoption of technocratic regulatory agencies that 
are often economically-driven and provide governance to enable and not replace markets,52  an 
approach strongly endorsed by the FCA,53 we argue that regulators in the UK are well-placed to 
make such strategic choices within a rational framework that navigates the contextual complexities. 
Regulation and Innovation 
Many commentators agree that much of financial innovation produces efficiency and widening 
access to consumers.54 Financial innovation has led to improvements in efficiencies such as the 
reduction of agency and transaction costs. 55 Kling points out that cost-effective fixed rate mortgages 
for consumers would not be possible without the financial innovation of interest rate hedging 
derivative products.56 Empirical research has found that cost-savings for financial institutions derived 
from financial innovation are often passed onto investors and borrowers.57 At a more macro level, 
Beck et al show that financial innovation correlates with increases in a country’s growth 
opportunities and GDP per capita,58 and is important for emerging economies in their 
development.59 Hence, innovation policy is often a key part of economic or industrial policy.60 To an 
extent, the FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox and the PRA’s New Bank Start-up Unit are facilitative 
frameworks supporting such broader economic policies. 
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Regulation is seldom understood to be the paradigm that promotes innovation. There is the 
perspective that regulation may be a hindrance or disincentive to innovation. Often, regulation 
adopts certain technologies and therefore hinder the adoption of new or more efficient 
technologies.61 For example, a number of regulatory standards that apply to investment advice 
assume that human judgment and discretion is involved,62 and may therefore not easily be 
transposed into a context where investment decisions are programmed to be auto-executed (the 
decentralised autonomous organisation for example),63 or where investment recommendations are 
the result of smart algorithmic analysis (robo-advice for example).64 Regulation based on ‘old’ 
technology may strait-jacket the manner in which financial services are to be provided, and may in 
time become under-inclusive or unsuitable.65 Innovations may also skirt the regulatory perimeter 
and raise questions of whether regulatory objectives are under-provisioned.66 
The latter is particularly important as much of financial innovation are not unequivocal goods. 
Financial innovation has yielded a mixture of benefits and harms. In terms of benefits, improved 
efficiencies and access to finance have been achieved, but increased levels of social and economic 
risk have also entailed.67A survey of the literature on what drives financial innovation highlights the 
dark side of such developments. Regulatory and tax environments68 are often important, and 
knowledge revolutions in economic, legal, communications and digital technologies69 are utilised 
towards financial innovation that is aimed at regulatory arbitrage (Knoll, 2008),70  i.e. exploiting gaps 
in regulation or regulatory regimes so that cost in compliance can be mitigated while pursuing 
profitable financial intermediation activity. For example, the development of processes to liquefy 
long-term relationship-based assets such as mortgage loans into liquid, standardised marketable 
securities has been motivated by the desire to evade stringent capital adequacy rules imposed on 
banks.71  
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Regulatory arbitrage, if left unattended to by regulators, could in time increase systemic risks. 72 This 
is because relatively un or under-regulated markets tend to create volumes of credit that may not be 
stringently under-written or generally well-controlled. Increased levels of debt across households 
and corporations could raise the risks of systemic fragility in the financial system.73 Further, the level 
of conduct risks posed to consumers or investors could be high as consumers increasingly depend on 
financial markets to meet their staple saving needs, and become a captive market that can be 
exploited.74  
In particular, Awrey75 proposes a supply-side theory of financial innovation that posits that financial 
innovation is driven by intermediaries’ need to create monopolies over their products in the short 
term in order to extract maximum rents in an extremely competitive environment. Thus, one can be 
sceptical of the social utility and welfare-enhancing benefits to the investing society. For example, 
Kay discusses a complex retail product called the ‘kick-out’ bond where investors buy into an Index-
linked product over a fixed term, and are able to ‘get out’ at intervals where upsides have been 
achieved or otherwise remain invested until maturity.76 The complex structure of the product leaves 
many investors less than able to appraise real investment and liquidity risks, and Kay queries what 
social utility is achieved by such innovation. 
Short-termist profit-seeking behaviour, although rationalised by the economic theory of the firm, 
could drive financial intermediary firms to produce financial innovation that is questionable in terms 
of social benefit, and could also adversely affect social welfare. For example, the financial innovation 
of derivatives, which was developed to hedge future financial risks is now a major subject of 
speculative trading in order to generate short-term profits for financial intermediaries.77 Much of 
financial innovation is poised to exploit investors’ value misperceptions in order to make short-term 
gains for financial intermediaries,78 and mis-sold to investors.79 A number of empirical researchers 
have also found that the development of highly leveraged products, such as synthetic exchange-
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traded funds serve primarily speculative purposes instead of genuinely beneficial economic 
purposes.80 
Financial innovation seems to be a double-edged sword, and in Awrey’s words, ‘welfare-
indeterminate’.81 However, the observed response on the part of many regulators is the prolonged 
adoption of a wait-and-see attitude that ultimately fails to catch up with the materialisation of 
problems.82 Regulators have tended to be cautious of stifling innovation, but have perhaps also been 
restrained due to an expertise gap between them and the industry. Arguably, they are schooled too 
heavily in favouring leaving markets to work.83 It is mistaken to assume that that the private 
incentives that drive financial innovation are socially aligned, or that restrained regulatory 
approaches to new phenomena are necessarily proportionate in nature. Regulators run the risk of 
creating shortfalls in meeting their regulatory objectives, or worse, facilitating the creation of 
externalities, such as in the global financial crisis 2007-9. 
Vermeulen et al 84 support a pro-active role for regulators in relation to financial innovation. 
Regulators need to assess whether socially costly regulatory barriers should be adjusted and also 
whether innovative activities need to be governed in order not to compromise public interest 
objectives. However, the pro-active approach towards regulation and innovation comes with a few 
hazards. This approach risks having a preponderant pro-innovation bias and can fall short of 
providing governance for financial innovation.85 The FCA’s and PRA’s pro-active approaches include 
being involved in bringing to market financial innovations. Although this approach allows regulators 
to gain deeper insights and understanding into products and market structures, such involvement 
raises the hazard of regulatory capture and the perception of ‘regulatory warranty’.  
Moreover, early regulation before an innovation has become mature may quickly be avoided or 
become obsolete. This is because regulators cannot foresee comprehensively all the risks that need 
to be managed or indeed may make incorrect judgments about where risks lie. MacNeil86 proposes 
an alternative approach to regulating innovation where market discipline and private litigation may 
be more robustly fostered to bring problems to light. The private law-creation process is arguably 
ideal for delicate balances to be struck in the articulation of legal rights and obligations, such a 
process ultimately feeding into the debate as to whether public regulation and standards are 
necessary. However regulation may be needed to facilitate such private accountability to begin with, 
so that contractual exclusions do not stifle the opportunities to develop private law jurisprudence. 
There is also a role for regulators to consider what may be efficiently standardised in due course.  
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Regulators’ proactivity towards financial innovation is arguably sound but this should not be a 
simplistic pursuit of promoting innovation, in light of the complexities in the interrelationship 
between regulation and innovation. Indeed regulators should develop regulatory strategy based on 
understanding these complexities in order to ensure that care is taken in this new regulatory 
approach. Such a framework for regulatory strategy should, as we propose, be constructed in a 
manner that facilitates rational, well-reasoned and consistent decision-making, supported by 
mechanisms of accountability.  
Innovation and Competition 
Finally, in our overview of the complex context for regulatory strategy, we observe that the PRA and 
FCA pursue the promotion of innovation as a proxy strategy for promoting competition. This is 
arguably an unconventional regulatory strategy. The traditional arsenal in a regulator’s toolkit for 
promoting competition is regulation and intervention against anti-competitive practices.87 Anti-
competitive regulation generally relates to ex post remedies such as penalising cartels and abusive 
behaviour in market dominance. The regulatory toolkit is commonly understood to be targeted at 
correcting market behaviour, not at intervening in markets themselves by introducing or promoting 
challenger products and firms. 
Although one must not understate the FCA’s sustained efforts in market investigations of anti-
competitive practices in the financial markets, including in wholesale corporate finance,88 asset 
management,89 and retail financial products such as mortgages90 etc, the deliberate promotion of 
challenger outfits that use alternative and new forms of technology is a new and unconventional 
measure. It is arguable that such a measure is itself somewhat distortive of markets as challenger 
services and products benefit from regulators’ promotion (albeit for a limited time under the 
Sandbox or Mobilisation approach).  
Promoting innovation is not conceptually the same as promoting competition (which is the FCA’s 
mandated regulatory objective in legislation). Innovation is driven by legal frameworks that protect 
innovators’ rights, therefore incentivising innovation as an entrepreneurial activity. Protective laws 
in intellectual property such as patents and copyright are proprietary in nature and tend to confer 
exclusive exploitation rights (or in other words, a form of monopoly) upon the intellectual property 
rights holders. Innovation is arguably promoted within a conceptual paradigm that is potentially 
antithetical to that of competition, as competition laws and principles seek to reduce monopolistic 
practices in order to improve market competition. Further, promoting innovation is situated within a 
paradigm that is focused on the individual or firm, while promoting competition is situated within a 
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paradigm focused on the market. In adopting the proxy strategy of promoting innovation to 
promote competition, the FCA and PRA risk conflating firm perspectives with market-based ones, 
and may develop excessive sympathies with firm-based perspectives.  
There is a need for the FCA and PRA to keep under review their assumption that promoting financial 
innovation is aligned with promoting competitive markets. To an extent the selection criteria for the 
Regulatory Sandbox engages with this, as the FCA does not admit of applicants producing innovation 
that may only be derivative or may not generate consumer utility. Nevertheless it is important for 
the regulators to map their firm-based perspectives onto market-based perspectives, so that the 
competitive potential of firms is coherently and consistently assessed. We argue that this should 
form part of regulatory strategy and will be addressed in our proposal for a rational model for 
strategic choices to be made. 
A Rational Model for Regulatory Strategy  
In governing financial innovation, regulators need to engage with balancing and potentially trading 
off different regulatory objectives and priorities. The FCA is in particular mandated to pursue several 
regulatory objectives, and commentators have warned that multiple objectives for a regulator 
necessarily entail strategic choices of trade-offs.91 The FCA’s predecessor the Financial Services 
Authority, a single regulator with multiple objectives, arguably made erroneous strategic choices in 
stewarding multiple regulatory objectives leading up to the global financial crisis 2007-9.92 Hence the 
UK regulators should do well to heed the lessons of the FSA and ensure that strategic choices can be 
optimally made.  
A key aspect of a framework for regulatory strategy is to ensure that balance and trade-offs can be 
made in a well-reasoned and consistent manner. We propose that the introduction of a significant 
dose of rationality in the implementation of the Sandbox and Mobilisation initiative is essential for 
regulatory strategy. This not only secures consistency and credibility in regulatory policy for 
governing financial innovation but also mitigates the intense relational influences that come through 
in the interfaces of regulator-firm engagement. This is consistent with the FCA’s purported approach 
in pursuing economically effective regulation.93  
First, we propose that there should be a systematic and rational approach to measuring the costs 
and benefits of innovation and/or competition, as well as regulation, by using the Sandbox and 
Mobilisation environments. Regulatory strategy should be informed by such findings. 
The Sandbox and Mobilisation environments suspend regulation for delimited amounts of time 
during testing of a firm’s innovation or challenger capacity. This testing environment should not only 
be put towards testing of the market viability of products and services, but should also serve as 
testing environments for the costs and benefits of regulation, innovation and competition. The 
testing environments create an environment sans regulation that can allow the social benefits and 
harms of the firm’s innovations, products and services to be measured. Indeed, regulators can also 
calibrate the testing environments to suspend different types of regulation at different stages in 
order to measure the levels of social benefits and harms generated by firm activities, and changes in 
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such levels between stages. These results can provide an informed picture as to what social benefits 
may be hindered by the cost of regulation, and what social harms are indeed prevented or 
addressed.  Both the benefits and cost of financial activity and regulation can be drawn out in the 
testing environments. Such results can be analysed at firm level and at an aggregate level in order to 
inform regulatory decisions and policy-making. 
The methodology of such cost-benefit analyses can be derived from regulatory cost-benefit analyses 
already performed for the introduction of new regulation in the UK. Cost-benefit analyses have been 
introduced in the UK where new regulation is introduced in order to rationalise policy-making in the 
UK.94 This is similar to initiatives elsewhere such as regulatory impact assessments in the US and EU. 
This form of analysis provides a rational information context to determine if new regulatory 
measures can be justified. Sunstein95 is careful however to advocate that the quantitative results of 
cost-benefit analyses should not per se determine regulatory policy, but play an important role in 
governing regulators’ discretion and in ensuring that regulatory policy is a result of rational and well-
informed deliberations. 
Cost-benefit analyses have however been criticised to be poorly carried out and failing to serve their 
purpose largely because (a) regulatory agencies fail to and in many instances are not able to quantify 
certain social benefits;96 and (b) regulatory agencies ignore the cost-benefit matrix and proceed with 
their chosen regulatory policy regardless.97  
However, we propose that the Sandbox and Mobilisation environments are rather optimal for 
carrying out meaningful cost-benefit analyses as such analyses would be based on data and 
information obtained during the testing period and before regulatory decisions are made. Such 
earlier stage cost-benefit analyses are regarded by commentators to be particularly useful in the 
formative stage of regulatory policy or decisions.98 Hence, they may suffer less from the problem of 
being merely cosmetic after regulators have already decided on their policy preferences. 
The chiefly quantitative paradigm for cost-benefit analyses may nevertheless not capture social 
benefits that are hard to quantify, or qualitative characteristics. Wiener argues that qualitative 
analyses should feature to form a holistic picture for the information context.99 Further, in order to 
achieve meaningful comparison between quantifiable cost and social benefits that are indirect or 
hard to quantify, it is possible to employ reasonable estimates100 or bridging analytical mechanisms 
(such as Sunstein’s ‘breakeven analysis’ that urges regulators to consider how small social benefits 
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could be or how large regulatory cost could be before a regulatory measure yields zero benefits. This 
ensures that regulators employ proportionality in regulatory strategy even if costs and benefits 
cannot be precisely quantified).101 We are of the view that the Sandbox and Mobilisation initiative 
provide environments for documenting and measuring a suite of social benefits (and costs) as 
intense engagement between regulators and firms is implemented and extensive reporting is 
expected on the part of firms. The implementation of the Sandbox and Mobilisation should ensure 
that the relevant cost-benefit information can be collected and reported, and there should be some 
dedication of resources on the part of the regulators to analyse the returns within a quantitative and 
qualitative cost-benefit matrix. Such can be carried out at firm level and can be aggregated, for each 
Sandbox or Mobilisation cohort for example, to provide higher-level perspectives.  
We suggest that cost-benefit analyses should be performed towards the end of the Sandbox or 
Mobilisation for each firm. This information context should form the basis for the Sandbox and 
Mobilisation unit’s regulatory decision for each firm as well as development in thinking for 
regulatory policy reform if relevant.  
Further, aggregate level analyses are important as they should be communicated to senior 
management for the purposes of developing higher-level principles or thinking on regulatory 
strategy. Such higher level governance reflects regulators’ risk appetites and priorities, qualitative 
matters that shape and are shaped by the rational cost-benefit analytical exercises discussed above. 
As the FCA for example has indicated desire to embrace more technologically-led innovations even 
in the interfaces that deal with current regulatory compliance, i.e. regtech,102 more comprehensive 
and coherent thinking is needed at senior management level, in the form of regulatory strategy, to 
chart the regulators’ course in navigating new technologically-led landscapes while maintaining 
objectivity and the fundamental stewardship of their regulatory objectives.  
By re-orienting the Sandbox, Advice Unit and Mobilisation towards rationality, regulatory strategy 
can be better informed and strategic choices can be made in a manner that is credible and 
consistent for he purposes of governing financial innovation. Policy development and regulatory 
design can also be developed to be more proportionate- a form of precisioning in regulation that 
could countervail the criticism that regulation is often one size-fits-all. It is possible that more exact 
cost-benefit findings can assist regulators in determining at a strategic level whether to introduce 
regulatory regimes tailored and proportionate to certain innovative business models. Such 
precisioning in regulatory measures can be fashioned so that the cost of regulatory compliance, 
which reflects the price to pay for achieving public interest objectives (such as financial stability or 
consumer protection) can be calibrated proportionately to the level of social benefits obtained (such 
as financial inclusion or consumer benefits relating to choice and better market prices). Such a 
considered and proportionate approach seems to fall in line with the FCA’s articulated framework 
for ‘Economics for Effective Regulation’.103 
The next Section turns to argue that the framework for regulatory strategy should be underpinned 
by appropriate organisational governance and accountability in order to protect its optimal qualities. 
These supporting pillars are essential for effectively and ultimately governing financial innovation.  
Organisational Governance and Accountability 
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Regulators’ close proximity to firms in the Sandbox, Advice or Mobilisation initiative may 
compromise regulators’ objectivity in making regulatory decisions or framing new policy or reforms. 
Hence, it is important to subject the relational dimensions to a framework for governance and 
accountability. Such is aimed at preserving objectivity and rationality in regulatory decision-making 
and policy formulation.  
Regulatory capture is a problem often highlighted in relation to financial regulators. They are 
susceptible to being influenced by firms during opportunities of engagement in consultation and 
feedback, and due to firms’ sustained lobbying power. The ‘revolving’ door between the regulator 
and industry (where senior industry figures often take up high regulatory positions and regulatory 
staff become attracted to industry jobs) is also an important factor.104 Although regulators need not 
be dominated by the industry’s agenda, subtle forms of influence that induce sympathy can often 
influence regulatory policy and decisions. Such sympathy can be a result of previous experience in 
the industry, trust in the industry for its expertise and sophistication (discussed as a feature of the 
industry’s epistemic authority in influencing policy and law-making),105 as well as simply prolonged 
exposure to the industry’s perspectives.  
The Sandbox and Mobilisation route are environments where regulators and firms engage in 
perhaps greater intensity than under regular supervision, giving rise to many opportunities for 
regulatory sympathy. Although the innovation and business development on the part of firms would 
be rather complete by the time of entering into the Sandbox or Mobilisation, the regulators are 
nevertheless involved in firms’ final developmental phases in achieving an interface with markets. 
This level of involvement risks being overly intimate with the ‘business’ aspects of the firm, and may 
affect regulators’ judgment about the firm and in relation to wider regulatory strategy. 
Regulators may also become impressed by the innovations and novelty they see, giving rise to a 
form of capture by the sophistication and authority of the industry. Regulatory sympathy may also 
arise from prolonged exposure to the industry’s perspectives, hence influencing regulatory decision-
makers to be persuaded relatively easily of the merits and benefits of firms’ services and products. 
Further, regulators may engage in gentle coaching exercises to assist firms in testing to emerge 
successfully.  
The intensity of regulator-firm engagement should not as a consequence be diluted as a response to 
fear of capture, as the relational dimension is key to gaining information regarding industry 
developments for the purposes of determining the effectiveness of existing regulatory policy and 
whether changes are needed. The preferred way forward is putting in place a governance 
framework to mitigate the influences of capture upon regulatory decision-making and policy.  
First, anchoring the Sandbox and Mobilisation environments in rational framework for regulatory 
strategy goes some way towards mitigating influences from capture. The rationality required in 
producing and reflecting upon the results of cost-benefit analyses for firms and at an aggregate level 
is an important facet for protecting regulatory objectivity. 
Further, we suggest other internal governance mechanisms targeted at protecting regulatory 
objectivity.  As discussed above, the framework for regulatory strategy should involve internal 
accountability to senior levels of management in a position to shape regulatory strategy. Further the 
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PRA and FCA could consider rotating regulatory decision-makers in the Sandbox and Mobilisation 
units so that fresh sets of eyes from the regulator would look at new cohorts of applicants for 
testing. Internal rotation could be useful for mitigating excessive regulatory sympathy and can 
generally be good organisational practice.  
Next, Baxter106 proposes that in order to mitigate regulatory capture of financial regulators, the 
regulatory policy process should accommodate a wider range of stakeholders so that the dominant 
influence of the industry can be moderated. Hence, we also propose channels of external 
accountability in order to mitigate any subtle influences of capture that entails from intense 
engagement with firms in promoting innovation. This involves regulators reaching out to other 
constituents such as independent bodies, other stakeholders, think-tanks etc, in order to create an 
environment of greater and richer deliberations and discussions. This model of ‘tripartism’ (referring 
to regulators, industry and other constituents) can also be usefully adapted to ensure that regulatory 
decision and policy in relation to Sandbox and Mobilisation firms, as well as financial innovation and 
challenger firms in general, are made in as objective a manner as possible. At the moment the FCA 
and PRA are required to consult a number of stakeholder panels in relation to policy or regulatory 
reform.107 Perhaps the duty to consult the Consumer Panel can be widened to include regulatory 
decisions for Sandbox and Mobilisation firms, and the Consumer Panel can be jointly maintained by 
the PRA and FCA. Or the Consumer Panel could be asked to sample a number of the cost-benefit 
analyses supporting samples of regulatory decisions for Sandbox and Mobilisation firms in order to 
ensure that there is some external and independent input into regulatory decision-making in the 
Sandbox and Mobilisation unit.  
We are also in favour of the establishment of a new Panel for the PRA and FCA jointly in order to 
deliberate on and act as a sounding board for broader policy matters relating to financial innovation 
and challenger firms. An Innovation Panel for example, which comprises of independent and 
qualified experts, can engage with regulators so as to provide non-industry based perspectives in 
relation to regulatory policy development for innovations and financial markets competition. They 
could also be co-opted to provide independent monitoring of the regulators’ strategy framework in 
relation to governing financial innovation. The formalisation of a third-party Panel for the above 
helps in de-biasing regulators and provides a useful alternative information resource from the 
industry.  
External accountability is important in scrutinising the performance of the regulators themselves in 
experimental forays and regulatory innovations. Hence we believe that a framework for regulatory 
strategy to govern financial innovation should also include accountability mechanisms not only 
within the regulators themselves but also externally.108 Further, if regulatory reform is to be 
developed, it is important for such reform not be perceived as excessively influenced by the 
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industry. External channels of accountability can work to constrain regulators from making choices 
based on ill-explained preferences109 and also protect them from pro-business political pressures.110  
C. Conclusion 
Financial innovation is dynamic and constantly arising. In this changing landscape, the UK regulators 
are determined to engage with the fast-paced developments in the industry as ‘fintech’, ‘techfin’ 
and ‘regtech’ could quickly elude the regulators’ grasp without some form of pro-active initiative. 
The FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox and Advice initiative, as well as the PRA’s Mobilisation initiative for 
challenger banks are novel regulatory mechanisms introduced to bring technologically-led financial 
innovation out of their shadows and designed to help the regulators meet the ‘promoting 
competition’ regulatory objective. Although these new mechanisms are only starting to capture a 
wider scope of financial innovation for the development of regulatory policy, they are poised to 
extend in scope and grow in importance. In this light this article considers the potential of the 
Sandbox, Advice and Mobilisation regimes for further development to become more mature and 
comprehensive regimes for governing financial innovation.  
We argue that the Sandbox, Advice and Mobilisation regimes should provide governance for and not 
be excessively focused on promoting market innovations. We raise some early concerns with the 
current approaches and propose to re-orient the current approaches towards a regulatory strategy 
framework for governing financial innovation. The interrelationships between regulatory objectives, 
promoting competition and encouraging innovation are complex and could involve synergies as well 
as tensions. Hence, a regulatory strategy framework is necessary to rationally evaluate the costs and 
benefits of market innovations and regulatory regimes. In this way, regulators have a more optimal 
and informed context in which to navigate their regulatory priorities. We believe this to be 
consistent with the FCA’s and PRA’s economically-driven models for regulation. Further, we urge the 
regulators to review their assumption that promoting innovation is aligned with promoting 
competition, as the tensions between the two should not be glossed over. Finally, we suggest that 
appropriate governance and accountability mechanisms are needed for the regulatory strategy 
framework.  
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